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the actual fed funds rate close to the intended
rate. This institutional fact has the unfortunate
side effect of leading some to believe that the
Federal Reserve has more control over interest
rates than it in fact does.
Let’s start the story at the beginning. The Fed
has price stability and economic growth objec-
tives. Price stability requires maintenance of low
and stable inflation. Price stability contributes
directly to economic growth; in addition, timely
policy adjustments can help to reduce fluctua-
tions in employment and output.
Put aside for now the fact that the FOMC
implements policy by setting the intended federal
funds rate, and concentrate instead on the objec-
tives of policy. In recent years, success is almost
absolute with respect to inflation and expected
inflation, both of which are low and stable. Suc-
cess is considerable, but incomplete, in terms of
output and employment. I do not mean to imply
that the Fed could have done more, but the econ-
omy’s performance over the last few years has not
been as robust as everyone wants. Unemployment
increased as a consequence of the mild 2001
recession and has continued to rise since the
recession ended in November 2001 because the
pace of recovery has been modest.
I’d like to convince you that in practice the
Fed has no latitude as to how to set the intended
federal funds rate, except for matters of short-term
timing, if it wants to achieve its objectives. Low
and stable inflation, and output growth along its
long-run growth path, imply a certain, though
not constant, long-term interest rate. The Fed
must deliver a path for the intended federal funds
rate consistent with the desired outcomes for the
economy in order to realize those inflation and
output goals.
I
’m pleased to be here today to discuss an
issue dear to all of our hearts: Long-term
interest rates and their recent behavior.
The gyrations of the bond market since
the beginning of May have created considerable
discussion. Some in the financial press and some
traders ask whether the Fed sent confusing signals
about prospects for monetary policy; others won-
der instead whether the bond markets misunder-
stood and overreacted to Fed announcements.
Rather than discuss these issues—which have
reached a “he-said, she-said” standoff—I would
like to step away to review the basics of the bond
market. I’ve often felt that longer-run fundamen-
tals tend to get lost in a welter of short-run con-
siderations that fade into oblivion quite quickly
as a new set of short-run concerns dominate the
news. I’ll discuss the fundamental determinants
of long-term interest rates, which I’ll index by the
benchmark yield on 10-year Treasury bonds.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments; Christopher J. Neely, Research officer at
the Bank, provided special assistance. However,
I retain full responsibility for errors.
FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINANTS
OF INTEREST RATES
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
implements monetary policy by setting an
intended, or target, federal funds rate, and then
engaging in open-market transactions to keepEconomists think of the benchmark 10-year
Treasury rate as having three components: the
real rate of interest, expected inflation, and a risk
premium for unexpected inflation. I’ll discuss the
determinants of the real rate of interest last.
The expected inflation component is not dif-
ficult to understand. Inflation eats away the pur-
chasing power of a bond; borrowers can pay off
their debts with dollars of depreciated purchasing
power. If expected inflation rises by 1 percentage
point, then nominal interest rates will rise by 1
percentage point too, all else equal. By far the
most important reason interest rates today are
far below their levels in 1981 is that actual and
expected inflation are much lower now.
No one knows exactly what inflation will be,
so lenders must be compensated for the fact that
coupon and principal payments will have uncer-
tain purchasing power. Inflation uncertainty is the
source of another component of nominal interest
rates. The more volatile and unpredictable is infla-
tion, the higher is this component of the nominal
rate—the inflation risk premium. Today, inflation
is expected to be fairly stable, so the inflation risk
premium is probably small, certainly consider-
ably less than in the late 1970s. It is very difficult
to sort out inflation expectations from inflation
uncertainty; I’ll lump the two together and simply
talk of inflation expectations.
I’ve mentioned that the large decline in inter-
est rates after 1981 was due to a large decline in
inflation expectations. If we examine interest
rates over a period when inflation changed a lot,
or across countries with very different inflation
rates, we’ll find that most of the variation of rates
is due to variation of inflation. But when we exam-
ine rates over a period characterized by inflation
stability, or across countries with similar inflation
rates, then interest rate variation cannot be attrib-
uted to inflation. The observed variation over
time, or differences across countries, reflects
forces determining the real rate of interest.
The real rate depends most centrally on the
expected productivity of physical capital. Investors
can choose whether to hold bonds or physical
capital, or equity claims to physical capital, in
their portfolios. Firms can choose to finance cap-
ital spending by issuing bonds. If the real interest
rate is too low relative to the expected return on
new investment in plant and equipment, then
there will be excess demand for funds to build
physical capital and the real interest rate will be
bid up. Conversely, if the real interest rate is too
high relative to expected returns, then there will
be an excess supply of funds and the real interest
rate will be bid down. Through these opportuni-
ties for substituting capital for bonds, or vice versa,
the real rate of return on bonds is linked to the
real rate of return on capital.
A robust economy and high productivity
means that businesses will seek to borrow to
finance future production, which will bid up
interest rates. Higher levels of economic activity
mean higher interest rates, all else equal. The
principal reason the 10-year bond rate is lower
today than it was at its monthly peak in January
2000 is that the demand for funds to finance capi-
tal investment is much lower today than it was
at the height of the previous economic boom.
We see this same economic force at work
when comparing interest rates in the United
States with those in Japan. Japan has been grow-
ing very slowly for a decade, going in and out of
recession. The demand for funds is low because
profitable investment opportunities are viewed
as limited. In contrast, the U.S. situation today is
viewed much more optimistically, even though
not as optimistically as it was four years ago.
All of these components of interest rates are
forward looking; they depend on expectations
about the future. We can’t directly observe these
components of long-term interest rates, but we
can estimate them.
Measuring expectations is inherently difficult,
but our tools for estimating expected inflation
have improved significantly in recent years.
Primarily, we use survey expectations of infla-
tion or the difference between yields on regular
Treasury bonds and Treasury inflation-indexed
securities (TIIS), which I’ll call simply “indexed
bonds” for short.
Indexed bonds, first issued by the Treasury
in 1997, contain a provision that increases their
principal and every semiannual interest payment
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the date of issue. These bonds, therefore, com-
pletely protect the investor from the effects of
inflation; the yield on the bonds is by definition
a real yield. If we assume that the inflation risk
premium is negligible, then the difference between
the yield on a conventional bond and a TIIS bond
measures the market’s expectation of future infla-
tion. For example, examining bonds maturing in
approximately 10 years, yesterday the indexed
bond had a yield of 2.38 percent while a conven-
tional Treasury bond had a yield of 4.53 percent.
These two bonds will turn out to have identical
yields if the inflation rate between now and 2013
averages 2.15 percent, the difference between
the two quoted yields. As a first approximation,
we can say that these two asset markets are pro-
viding us with the information that investors
expect that the inflation rate will average 2.15
percent over the next 10 years.
The expected rate of inflation depends both
on what the Fed says and what it has done. Mar-
kets pay attention to what the Fed says it wants
to do because it has built up a reservoir of credi-
bility by providing low and stable inflation for
some time. But words aren’t enough. Ultimately,
any central bank’s policy actions must be consis-
tent with its words or it will lose the public’s trust.
If the Fed doesn’t maintain policies consistent
with low inflation, inflation expectations will
begin to rise. And if inflation expectations rise,
long-term interest rates will also rise—holding
all else constant.
So, yields on long-term Treasury bonds have
an expected inflation component and a real com-
ponent. The yields on other bonds, such as cor-
porate bonds, contain another component: credit
risk. The interest differential depends on the pos-
sibility that the borrower will default. Credit risk
depends on the individual bond issuer and often
changes over the course of the business cycle,
increasing as business conditions deteriorate. The
most dramatic example of this phenomenon is
that the spread between yields on junk bonds
and government bonds tends to widen during
recessions and narrow during expansions. The
rises and falls of default risk are quite naturally
linked to the state of the economy.
One final component of interest rates arises
from the liquidity or illiquidity of the bond. Bonds
that are actively traded in large volume are highly
liquid. An investor can buy or sell substantial
amounts with little or no impact on yield. Even
within the Treasury market, we observe signifi-
cant differences in liquidity of various issues.
Trading tends to be concentrated in benchmark
issues, such as the 10-year maturity. Bonds with
9 years to maturity and 11 years to maturity trade
at a yield a few basis points higher than the 10-
year bond.
A REVIEW OF MAJOR INTEREST
RATE DEVELOPMENTS
These fundamental concepts are what we
need to understand interest rate developments
in recent years. Using annual data, the peak year
for the 10-year Treasury bond rate was 13.91 per-
cent, in 1981. It’s hard to know exactly what the
real rate was at that time because unambiguous
data are not available. However, the premium for
inflation expectations and inflation uncertainty
was surely quite large.
After 1982, inflation fell to the 4 percent range
but interest rates remained quite high. The 10-
year rate was above 8 percent every year in the
1980s, except for 1986, when it averaged 7.68
percent. As the economy grew after the mild
recession of 1990-91, the bond rate actually fell
slowly on average through the end of 1998. A long-
term decline in bond rates during an economic
expansion is a decidedly rare event, as rates typi-
cally rise during an expansion. Declining expected
inflation and declining inflation risk explain
this outcome. Based on survey data, expected
CPI inflation declined from roughly 5 percent at
the beginning of 1990 to a bit over 2 percent at
the end of the decade. I suspect that declining
inflation risk also contributed to the decline in
bond rates, but no satisfactory series on inflation
risk exists.
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1998 reflected concerns, in the markets and in
the FOMC, about the effects of the Russian default
in August and the severe problems faced by Long
Term Capital Management, which broke into the
open in September. By the end of the year, the
economy shook off these concerns and the eco-
nomic boom resumed in full force in 1999. The
demand for capital was high, and handsome
returns in the stock market led investors in that
direction away from bonds. To keep inflation
under control and temper the boom, the Fed
raised the intended federal funds rate.
Using data on indexed bonds, first issued in
1997, we have a pretty good fix on real interest
rates. As the economic boom intensified once the
economy got past the disruption in the fall of
1998, real rates rose. The 10-year indexed bond
yield peaked at about 4.4 percent in January
2000, but inflation expectations remained in the
neighborhood of 2 percent. Accordingly, the 10-
year nominal Treasury bond yield also peaked in
January 2000, at about 6¾ percent.
As the economy softened over the course of
2000 and reached a business cycle peak in March
2001, bond rates began to fall. The Fed began to
ease policy in January 2001. Interestingly, bond
rates initially rose, as the market apparently
believed that Fed easing would stimulate the
economy fairly quickly and lead to a resumption
in growth of credit demands. That was not to be;
as we know now, the economy continued to drift,
first in the mild recession that lasted from March
to November of 2001 and then only modestly up
in 2002.
On several occasions over the last three years,
forecasts of more buoyant growth were disap-
pointed. The combination of capital overhang
from the investment boom of the late 1990s,
shocks from major bankruptcies, the tragedy of
9/11, and corporate governance scandals held
the economy back. When expected increases in
credit demands did not materialize and with the
disappointing performance of the stock market,
investors bid bond rates down. Long-term infla-
tion expectations may have drifted down a little
during this period, but most of the decline in the
bond rate reflected a decline in the real rate of
interest. By the middle of this year, the 10-year
indexed bond yield, which had been about 4.4
percent in late 1999, was down to about 1.5 per-
cent. That yield, by the way, has now rebounded
to about 2.4 percent.
I think that the right interpretation of the
rebound in the real rate of interest in recent weeks
is that the market expects a resumption of eco-
nomic growth, with accompanying resumption
of stronger credit demands. I believe that the
evidence for this interpretation is substantial,
because we know from previous business cycles
and from cross-country evidence that the real
rate of interest tends to be higher in economies
with higher growth rates.
THE IMPORTANCE OF
TRANSPARENCY
I’ve concentrated on longer-run fundamentals
because I think that is the right place to look for
explanations of significant changes in interest
rates. The market is constantly seeking to under-
stand the longer-run direction of the economy;
however, trends are always easy to identify after
the fact and difficult to read in real time.
On top of the longer-run trends in interest
rates is an overlay of short-run noise. By “noise”
I mean small day-to-day and week-to-week fluc-
tuations that later turn out to reflect mispercep-
tions, very temporary liquidity changes, and such
things. If you look at a graph of quarterly average
data, much of the noise disappears. If you look at
a graph of daily data and go back to the daily
financial press, you will see the news, rumors,
and speculations that lie behind much of the
noise. If you go back to the daily news, which I
did at great length as an academic before I came
to the Fed, you will likely be bored by most of
what you read. Most of the accounts describe
noise that has no value in understanding the
fundamentals driving longer-run developments.
The stance of monetary policy is one of the
fundamentals in the larger picture, because if the
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along it potential growth path with low and stable
inflation and interest rates will not settle at, or
fluctuate around, the level appropriate to an
economy growing at its full potential.
Because of the market’s intense interest in
monetary policy, the FOMC has a major commu-
nications challenge. I spoke in some detail on that
topic in a speech two weeks ago in Philadelphia,
and do not want to repeat that entire discussion
here. The bottom line is that one of the Fed’s jobs
is to communicate as accurately as possible so
the market can determine interest rates efficiently.
That means that the Fed needs to do the best it
can to convey the essential elements of policy
clearly and not itself be a source of short-run
noise in the market. To me, an essential ingredi-
ent of good Fed communications is to focus on
longer-run fundamentals and on how the FOMC
pursues its objectives by adjusting the stance of
policy to the arrival of new information.
Even if the Fed were to communicate its
objectives and methods perfectly, the future path
of the federal funds rate would never be perfectly
predictable because the FOMC must change the
intended rate from time to time as new informa-
tion arrives. Not to do so would create problems,
such as the Great Inflation of the 1970s. That infla-
tion was a consequence of policy adjustments
that were too frequently too little and too late. In
the end, those policy mistakes led to more uncer-
tainty, because of the inflation, and larger interest
rate changes than would have occurred if the Fed
had been willing to act earlier and decisively.
Given that the FOMC must respond in timely
fashion to new information, and certainly has for
at least 20 years, I’ll make the claim that mis-
communication accounts for only a trivial fraction
of interest rate changes in recent years. Incident-
ally, “respond in timely fashion” does not neces-
sarily imply frequent policy adjustments. In the
more stable inflation environment we enjoy today,
the Fed has far more freedom than it had in the
1970s to wait for information to accumulate.
Because the events that drive changes in the
stance of policy are unpredictable, the intended
federal funds rate cannot itself be predictable.
What ought to be predictable is the Fed’s commit-
ment to its policy goals and its response to events
as they occur. Fed responses are not perfectly
predictable today because no one inside or outside
the Fed knows how to write an explicit recipe
for conducting policy. However, there is ample
evidence that policy is substantially predictable,
as the market and the Fed most often do read the
implications of arriving information the same way.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Now I’ll pull the analysis together. With regard
to inflation expectations and inflation risk,
prospects going forward are excellent. Actual
and expected inflation have been quite stable in
recent years, and there is every reason to antici-
pate that these attractive conditions will remain
in force. The market appears to have great confi-
dence in the Federal Reserve’s commitment to
price stability and its powers to maintain the
inflation rate within the range of experience of
recent years. Moreover, the stunning increase in
productivity in the second quarter announced
this morning and the strong case that handsome
productivity increases will continue—even if not
as stunning as the second quarter data—makes
inflation control considerably easier than it other-
wise would be. Although we must always be alert
to inflation or deflation surprises coming out of
the woodwork, there is, in my view, the prospect
going forward that inflation will be benign and
that the risks in this direction are as low as we
have seen in the last 40 years.
With regard to prospects and risks on the real
rate of interest, my message is that the risks are
tied to risks with respect to economic growth. As
I examine growth expectations of professional
forecasters, such as the Blue Chip panel, my read
is that the consensus outlook is for solid and bal-
anced economic growth going forward. However,
as I always emphasize when discussing the eco-
nomic outlook, forecasts change over time, some-
times significantly, and at any given time there is
a range of professional opinion on the outlook.
Should we see a continuation of a sluggish recov-
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fall somewhat from current levels. Should we
see a gangbusters recovery, then the prospects
are that rising credit markets will drive bond rates
above current levels. In either case, the action
will be primarily in the real rate of interest and
not, I believe, in the inflation premium compo-
nent of rates.
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